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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Keeping out non-local garbage: An end-run around
the dormant Commerce Clause?
by Robert H. Abrams
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc.
v.
Michigan Department of Natural Resources, et aI.,
(Docket No. 91-636)
Argument Date: March 30,1992
ISSUE
Does a state statute that prohibits the disposal within a
county of any solid waste that has been generated outside the
county, including all out-of-state waste, impermissibly dis-
criminate against interstate commerce in violation of the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution?
FACTS
The underlying statutory provisions in this case are some-
what more complex than in other contemporary cases
presenting dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state
laws that limit the interstate movement of solid waste. Here,
the primary statutory command of section 13a of the
Michigan Solid Waste Management Act, Mich. CompoLaws
Ann. § 299.413a (1991 Supp.), prohibits anyone from accept-
ing for disposal "solid waste or municipal solid waste in-
cinerator ash that is not generated in the county in which the
disposal area is located unless the acceptance of [out-of-coun-
ty material] is explicitly authorized in an approved county
solid waste management plan."
The county solid-waste management plan process that
might give authorization for accepting out-of-county
materials is somewhat cumbersome. A thumbnail sketch of
the steps required to gain approval of a plan include (1)
adoption by the county board of commissioners, (2) approval
by the governing bodies of not less than 67 percent of the
municipalities within the county, and (3) approval by the
Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources.
In this case, the county in which the Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill site (hereinafter Fort Gratiot) is located, St. Clair
County, had a solid-waste management plan that did not
authorize the acceptance of out-of-county materials at any
in-county landfills.
In early February 1989, Fort Gratiot approached St. Clair
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County officials seeking an amendment to that county's
solid-waste management plan to allow Fort Gratiot to import
1,750 tons of out-of-county solid waste per day. The
authorization would have more than quadrupled operations
at the landfill site that was then accepting 500 tons per day of
in-county waste. Using 65 cubic yard trucks, this increase in
activity would have amounted to the delivery of roughly 80
extra truckloads ofsolid waste each day. Relying on a county
waste planning commission report that landfilling wastes at
that rate would exhaust all remaining in-county approved
municipal solid-waste landfills within six years, the county
officials declined to go any further with the requested amend-
ment of the county solid-waste management plan.
Within days of that determination, in March 1989, Fort
Gratiot initiated this litigation challenging the legislative
scheme as impermissibly discriminating against out-of-state
waste being transported to privately owned and operated
landfills such as theirs. No challenge was raised to the statute
as it applied to publicly owned facilities. Fort Gratiot's
challenge was rejected by both the United States District
Court and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit. See Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. V. Michigan
Department ofNatural Resources, 931 F.2d 413 (1991).
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
This case and another pending Supreme Court case,
Chemical Waste Management,lnc. v.Hunt (previewed in this
issue at page 337), require the Court to revisit the dormant
Commerce Clause in the increasingly important context of
state efforts to limit and control the importation of waste
materials generated in other states. (The operation of the
commerce clause in this setting is referred to as "dormant"
because the power of the federal government acts as a limit
on state power without affirmative congressional legislative
action.) Here, an "in-county only" rule is being applied to
private facilities that provide disposal for "ordinary" solid
waste (predominantly municipal trash and its associated in-
cinerator ash), while the Chemical Waste case involves a
state-imposed tipping fee system (i.e., a tax) that requires
hazardous waste imported from other states to be taxed at a
substantially higher rate than hazardous waste that is
generated in-state.
The states are being pushed in the direction of restricting
access to their waste disposal sites by a number of factors.
The citizenry, alarmed by news of environmental disasters
such as Love Canal and Times Beach, have become militant
in their opposition to siting waste disposal facilities. While
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this trend (frequently called the NIMBY-not in my back
yard-phenomenon) applies with greatest force in the haz-
ardous waste field, even landfills accepting only municipal
solid waste can pose an environmental threat to aquifers and
some nearby surface streams. Thus behind the public outcry
lie genuine environmental and public health concerns, tradi-
tionally areas of regulation lying near the heart of the states'
police power.
At the same time public sentiment presses for protection
against importing environmental problems as a by-product of
importing waste, as a matter of intrastate economics and
planning, excluding such waste benefits all segments of the
local populous except the operator of the landfill. By legis-
lating away non-local competition for use of the landfill
space, the demand for that space is reduced, meaning that the
price of disposal for locally generated waste will be lower.
Just as important, in areas where acceptable landfill sites are
rare, a local-only rule extends the effective life of the landfill
sites as repositories for locally generated wastes by prevent-
ing them from being filled with imported waste in the mean-
time. Applying these precepts to the current case, it seems
fair to conclude that in the absence of regulation that blocks
waste importation, Fort Gratiot would be able to both (1)
charge a higher price for all waste accepted and (2) fill the
dumpsite more quickly.
As a matter of legal doctrine, the dormant Commerce
Clause has long stood as a bulwark against myriad forms of
local protectionism. One hallmark phrase that captures the
sentiment of many of the cases expresses an anti-Balkaniza-
tion principle when it declares, "Our economic unit is the
nation." Looking more narrowly at the precedents that most
closely resemble this case, two come to mind. First, in
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), the Court
invalidated New Jersey's effort to exclude from in-state
landfills out-of-state solid waste of the sort involved in this
case. Second, in Dean Milk v. City ofMadison, 340 U.S. 349
(1951), the Court invalidated a local ordinance that dis-
criminated in favor of local dairies to the disadvantage of both
out-of-state and non-local in-state producers. While these
two cases seem to point toward an outcome favoring Fort
Gratiot, there are factors pointing the other way also. Initial-
ly, the composition of the Court has changed since Philadel-
phia was decided in 1978, and Justice (now Chief Justice)
Rehnquist wrote a strong dissent in that case arguing in favor
of the right of states to forbid out-of-state waste. Additional-
ly, at least one intervening case, Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S.
131 (1986), upheld a ban on the importation ofbaitfish where
that ban was found to be vital to protecting aspects of the
state's environment.
It is difficult to gauge the significance of this case. Any
decision that validates a means for restricting landfill space
to in-state residents is bound to have some potential for
encouraging similar legislation in other states. Laws that
erect only local discrimination, such as that in effect here
favoring only in-county waste generators, may not pose much
of a problem for the nation and may not be widely copied.
Issue No. 10
Local discrimination will frequently have only marginal im-
pacts on interstate commerce. Beyond that, local option laws,
because they disadvantage many would be in-state customers
who are not local, are less likely to win political support in
the state legislature where citizens feeling part of the
regulatory burden are represented. Thus, it seems fair to
predict that even if the Court affirms the validity of the
Michigan statute in this case, there will not be the same rush
to emulate the Michigan legislation as would occur if the
Court upheld a law that discriminated exclusively against
out-of-state waste.
ARGUMENTS
For Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. (Counsel ofRecord,
Harold B. Finn III; Finn, Dixon & Herling, One Landmark
Square, Stamford, CT 06901; telephone (203) 964-8000):
1. The state law in this case impermissibly discriminates
against interstate commerce even though the same law
interdicts some intrastate commerce in the same articles.
2. Even though the case may be treated as involving natural
resources, the ordinary jurisprudence of dormant Com-
merce Clause cases applies, and the statute here is there-
fore subject to the strict scrutiny given to discriminatory
legislation.
3. The waste-importation restrictions at issue here do not
serve a legitimate local purpose, nor are they the least
commerce-burdensome method of achieving the state's
objectives.
For the State of Michigan (Counsel of Record, Thomas L.
Casey, Assistant Solicitor General, PO Box 30212, Lansing,
M148909; telephone (517) 373-1124):
1. The law at issue regulates an area of legitimate local
concern and does so in an even-handed fashion.
2. This legislation is not facially discriminatory against in-
terstate commerce and, at most, imposes only an inciden-
tal burden on that commerce.
3. There are no less commerce-burdensome alternatives that
adequately protect Michigan's legitimate waste manage-
ment and environmental interests.
4. The market participant doctrine and principles of state
sovereignty protect this Act against dormant Commerce
Clause invalidation.
For St. Clair County (Counsel ofRecord, Lawrence R. Ter-
nan; Beier Howlett, 200 E. Long Lake Road, STE 110, Bloom-
field Hills, M148304-2361; telephone (313) 645-9400):
1. The legislation has the legitimate purpose of managing
solid waste, does not discriminate against interstate com-
merce, and has only minimal effects on interstate commerce.
2. Strict scrutiny should not be applied in this case where
there is a legitimate local purpose and the statute is not an
economic protectionist measure.
3. Regulation of solid waste is a fundamental responsibility
of state and local governments in their primary role as
protectors of the environment.
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